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Recent  crisis in international markets have focused attention on the health of the banking system 
in each and every country.  Two thousand eight crisis started in the center with the US mortgage 
market problems  and spread  into core and periphery.  As structured investment vehicles and 
mortgage related insurance depreciated in value, it invalidated many behavioral assumptions in 
risk/reward/hedging models and left the financial sector with unknown and evaporating assets 
and with larger known liabilities.   
 
There are many  ideas  now as to what happened and how the crisis spread  in both academic and 
daily studies. Perhaps an amalgam of all is responsible for the failure we are seeing so far.   
Barber wrote that  gambling behavior and principal  agent problem broke the banks   (Barber, 
2008) .   Obsfelt and Rogoff  (2005) predicted that a crisis in the system was forthcoming due to 
the trade deficits of the US  since 2000, others found lack of information and opaqueness of the 
credit default swaps and moral hazard were the culprits. With hindsight, it is now accepted that 
letting Lehman Bank go into bankruptcy was a crucial mistake which dried up the credit markets  
(Fitzpatrick, 2008).   There is also consensus that the reason behind this financial bubble was that 
the US Federal Reserve had kept the interest rates too low to ease the US out of the 2000 stock 
market tech bubble, which then resulted in the  mortgage bubble.   
 
While this crisis is currently under study, there are many studies which have already studied 
financial market crisis in the emerging markets. In “Models of Economic and Financial Crises”,  
Mariano,  Gultekin, Ozmucur,  and Shabbir (2000) reviewed different techniques for measuring 
crisis and found their methodology of Markov switching models with varying transition 
probabilities had the best predictions using selected indicators. Chang and Andres ( 1998) 
presented a simple model that can account for the main features of recent financial crises in 
emerging markets.  They find that  international illiquidity of the domestic financial system is at 
the center of the problem and that  illiquidity in  banks of a necessary and sufficient condition for 
financial crises to occur.  They state that the short maturity of capital inflows can contribute to 
bank fragility, that in the event of a crisis, large real costs may be incurred as a result of early 
liquidation of investments, and asset prices may consequently fall farther than they would have 
had this liquidity crunch been avoided.  Note that this model also helps explain the current crisis 
the banking system in  the US, Europe is gong through now.  Durbin and Ng (1999) investigated 
the role of “country risk” in determining the default risk of firms in emerging markets. They use 
firm-level data on bond prices to study the relationship between sovereign risk and firm risk.  
The results of the investigation indicate that market participants do not strictly apply the 
“sovereign ceiling”, under which no firm is more creditworthy than its government.  The 
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sovereign ceiling rule has significant direct implications for asset markets because of the role that 
rating agencies play in the pricing of emerging market debt.  The correlation of country risk to 
firm risk is higher for some industries, however banks are bailed out at time of crises and face 
soft budget constraints.    The paper finds evidence that transfer risk is less than 100%.    
Creane, et. al. (2004) assessed 20 countries in MENA with respect to their financial sector 
development using data from IMF surveys as well as data banks. They find major variations in 
financial development between countries.  In MENA, they found good  regulations of the 
banking system and good supervision of the financial markets, yet they noted that while MENA 
countries have had financial deepening in the last few decades, they were not able to keep up 
with the progress of  Southeast Asia.   
 
Bashir (2002) studied Islamic bank performance for eight countries between 1993 and 1998 for 
their profitability and efficiency. He finds that given everything else constant, higher profits are 
due to higher leveraging and higher loan to asset ratios, and those banks that take higher risks are 
rewarded accordingly. He states “The results also indicate that foreign-owned (Islamic)  banks 
are more profitable than their domestic counterparts. Everything remaining equal, there is 
evidence that implicit and explicit taxes affect the bank performance measures negatively. 
Furthermore, favorable macroeconomic conditions impact performance measures positively. Our 
results also show that stock markets are complementary to bank financing” .  Agarwal and 
Yousef  (2000) stated that high degrees of imperfect information and rent-seeking behavior are 
the main characters of the developing economies where Islamic banks operate. The banks face 
agency problems due to contractual incompleteness and economies will be biased towards debt 
financing when characterized by agency problem.    
 
Dar et. al (2001) stated the  importance of the Gulf Region with regards to Islamic financial 
activities. The Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) is considered the third largest region, which 
account for about 13% of total assets of Islamic Banks worldwide. Currently, Islamic banks do 
not need financial cushion since depositors share profit and losses.  There are a sufficient 
numbers of  borrowers and investors in Islamic and non-Islamic countries to warrant the 
attention of traditional banks  (Poulous, et. al.,  2003). Almost all forms of  western commercial 
banking have the counterparts in Islamic banking. There are Islamic versions of Repos, Leasing, 
Hire Purchase, Equity investment, Venture capital, non-recourse project finance and even 
Islamic Derivatives,   financial instruments derived from another financial instrument or a 
combination of instruments.  
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DIVERSIFICATION OF MIDDLE EAST BANK PORTFOLIOS  
 
ME banks are not any different than other banks when it comes to quality of management and 
the diversification of the portfolios.  While the regulatory agencies may monitor for the CAL 
ratios (capital adequacy, assets, liquidity), performances of individual banks depend on their 
portfolio mix and risk adjusted returns.  Using  modern portfolio theory, we discuss its 
implications for ME banks using  mean-variance efficient portfolio approach.   
  
 If a bank has N risky asset choices with random returns , we can denote the returns vector  R as 
 R     = [ R1   .  .   .   RN ]    [1] 
  And the expected returns as 
  E R  =  =  [ 1  . . .  N ]    [2] 
  Defining covariance matrix of returns as 
  = COV R ,      [3] 
  And the portfolio  weight vector of each asset as  
           
 =  [  1  .  .  .    N  ]    [4] 
 
Then the expected return in the portfolio is 
 
N 
 i I = 
T
.      [5] 
i=1 
          
  where  superscript T denotes  the transpose. 
 
By definition, the variance of returns of the bank portfolio will be 
 
  
T
.       [6]   
 
Since banks want to maximize expected returns while minimizing risks (i.e., the standard 
deviation of returns), we set the Langrangian function with  multipliers 1 , 2 such that  
 
L(  , 1 , 2) = 
T
 +  1 ( P - 
T
P ) +   2(1 - 
T
1) [7] 
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Here, the  first constraint shows the weights in the mean-variance efficient portfolio that will 
give a desired return of P  and the second constraint (1 is a vector of ones) states that all weights 
to sum up to 100%. 
 
To solve, set  the first derivatives of the function L  to zero 
 
          
0 =      L( , 1, 2) = 2 P - 1  - 21    [8] 
         
 
The solution of (8) for   gives the  optimal  weights of the portfolio.  
 
 For a bank that faces  two risky asset choices, the solution for the variance of the portfolios will 
be  
 
R
2 
  =     w
2
1
2
   +  (1-  w) 
2
2
2
  + 2w (1-w) 12 
  
1
 
2     [9] 
 
and the expected return is 
 
E(R  )=   w 1  +  (1-w)  2      [10] 
  
An important aspect of the solution lies in the correlation (or lack of)  between the two risky 
assets.  If the two risky assets are uncorrelated (i.e.,   12 = 0), we can easily achieve the locus of 
points that describe the risk-reward path of the portfolio choice by assigning various weights to 
two assets, once the returns and standard deviations are known.   For example, for two risky 
assets with expected returns of 10 and 20 percent, respectively, and with standard deviations of 
0.2 and 0.4, the equations reduce to an expected return of 
 
E(R)  =  (0.10)w + (0.20) (1-w)= 0.20 –0.10 w 
 
And a variance of returns of 
 
2
    =  w
2 
(0.2)
 2
   + (1- w ) (0.4)
2
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which reduces to  
 
2
    =0.16-0.32w + 0.20 w
2
 
 
Minimizing the variance  gives us the optimal weight of the first asset at 80 % weight and the 
second asset at 20 % weight.  The expected return on the portfolio then  comes out to be 12 %  
and the standard deviation  is 0.1789.    Finance literature shows these relationships with the 
sideways parabolic functions.  If there is some correlation between the assets, the parabolic 
function of returns to risk plot changes.  The return adjusted by the risk ratio
2
 is lower, the higher 
the correlation between risky assets. 
 
Figure 1 below shows a 3-D graph with varying portfolio weights for Asset 1, its variance (sigma 
squared) on the vertical axis, and correlation coefficient (rho)   12   between two assets versus 
weight on the horizontal ones .  Note that the lower the correlation between assets, the lower is 
the variance. 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
   The return to risk ratio is not the  Sharpe ratio, which examines the deviation of return from a riskless rate.  Even though Sharpe 
ratio is a better measure of investment performance,  we do not have any  estimates of „riskless rates‟ for the MENA financial markets. 
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In Figure 2, the weight of Asset 1, the correlation between assets and the risk (sigma) ratio is 
plotted.  Again, the higher the correlation coefficient between assets, the higher the weight of the 
risky asset, the higher is the risk of the portfolio. 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
  
FIGURE 3 plots the return to risk ratio of the portfolio (Sharpe) in the vertical axis  with the 
correlation coefficient between assets and the weight of asset 1.  In this example, the maximum 
return/risk ratio is around 0.62  when correlation between assets is zero. 
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FIGURE 3 
 
 
EVIDENCE FROM EGYPT: 
 
We examine  general conditions of Egyptian Banks  by examining  central bank summary 
statements.  All banks face constraints of capital adequacy, asset and management quality issues, 
efficiency problems  and liquidity risks.  Some risks are easier to isolate and quantify than others.  
One major risk that developing country banks face is inflation risks and related currency risks.  
To hedge for domestic currency depreciation and to protect loan portfolio quality, some banks 
hedge by loaning  (or „investing‟) in foreign currency loans and assets. In the  2005 study, we 
noted  “ For banks in Saudi Arabia, where the value of the currency has been stable over some 
time, we find currency risks to be minimal compared to the other two countries.  For Egypt and 
Jordan, the degradation of the domestic loan portfolio may be a major problem. “  (Cinar, 2005).  
However, since then, increasing foreign exchange exposure to hedge the portfolio may have been 
a very risky strategy if the monies went into hedge funds in financial markets,  given the banking 
crisis in dollar and euro markets.  Hedge funds, including private funds from Saudi Arabia who 
backed Citicorp and other financial institutions have taken billions of dollars of losses since 
summer of 2008.  How has Egypt  fared during this time? 
 
Egyptian  Central Bank. summary reports are given in the Appendix.  Table 1A  reflects the 
trends in lending extended by the banking system in Egypt.  The table shows  that the banks have 
 9 
increased their foreign exchange lending  by  of 10 %  (from 20% to 30% weight) in the last 
seven years, which is in line with the hedging their portfolios, as analyzed in the above section.  
In 2000, average domestic currency lending  was about 80 % and it decreased to  70 % by 2007. 
Most of this decrease  came from decreased  domestic currency  lending in trade.  Of  the  10% 
increased lending in foreign currencies, while agriculture, trade, services stayed relatively same, 
it was the remarkable growth in industrial lending in foreign currency.  Had this been services, 
there was room for worry, but Egypt, by increasing efficiency yet keeping it for the industrial 
sector, has avoided a head on collision with the current  crisis  by doing the best possible. 
 
REFER TO TABLE 1A IN THE APPENDIX 
 
The next table shows the balance sheet of banks in Egypt. Between 2006 to 2007,  balances with 
banks abroad almost doubled, where as liabilities remained steady since 2000.  
 
REFER TO TABLE 1B IN THE APPENDIX 
 
What has saved Egypt from exposure to the crisis is that the  banking system still loan a large 
portion of the portfolios to domestic borrowers in domestic currency.   
 
If we consider domestic versus foreign lending as two different assets, we can then construct 
some  portfolio characteristics  for the banking system of Egypt and some neighbors.  Table  2 
presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of the prices of gold and currencies in USD for  
gold, USD/EURO, USD/Jordanian Dinar, USD/Saudi Arabian Riyal, USD/Egyptian Pound and 
USD/Bahrainian Dinar.     The correlations are calculated from daily spot closing prices for the 
time period 12/28/2000 to 10/13/2004. 
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TABLE    2:  PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS USING DAILY DATA 
  12/28//2000 TO  10/13//2004 FOR EGYPT, NEIGHBORS AND CURRENCIES 
 
 GOLD USD/EUR USD/JOD USD/SA USD/EGYPT USD/BAHRAIN 
GOLD 1 0.941** -0.253** 0.087** -0.910** 0.046 
USD/EUR 0.941** 1 -0.270** 0.078* -0.919** -0.035 
USD/JOD -0.253** -0.270** 1 0.044 0.291** 0.042 
USD/SA 0.087** 0.78* 0.044 1 -0.108** 0.016 
USD/EGYPT -0.910** -0.919** 0.291** -0.108** 1 0.060 
USD/BAHRAIN 0.046 -0.035 0.042 0.016 0.060 1 
N=939 
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*   correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Sources:  Gold prices are from http://www.amark.com/archives/data.asp.  Currencies are from 
http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/. 
 
 
The Bahraini Dinar exchange rates are not statistically correlated with any other currency or 
species listed above.  The Pearson correlation coefficients for the other currencies are statistically 
significant.  For Egypt for this time period, the  exchange rate is strongly negatively related  to 
the closing daily prices of gold and  the USD/Euro rate and is also slightly negatively correlated 
with the Saudi Arabian currency.   
 
We see that the SA currency is the only one which has a positive correlation between its 
exchange rate and the USD/Euro rate.  The largest negative correlation in the table is between 
the USD Euro rate and the Egyptian pound  
(-0.916), due to the depreciation of the Egyptian pound.  The largest currency  risk  is within the 
Egyptian banking system.   
 
To reinforce these findings  and to alleviate the problems due to the declining value of the dollar  
vis a vis the Euro in recent years, and to smooth daily fluctuations, the same correlations were 
estimated  using monthly data between the four countries exchange rates between themselves.  
The following table reports these correlations  for the monthly data. 
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TABLE   3 :  PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS USING MONTHLY DATA 
  1/1/2000 TO 12/1/2004 
   Bahrain Saudi Egypt Jordan 
Bahrain Pearson Correlation 1.000 -0.049 0.136 0.122 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.712 0.301 0.353 
      
Saudi Pearson Correlation -0.049 1.000 -.397** -0.146 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.712  0.002 0.265 
      
Egypt Pearson Correlation 0.136 -.397** 1.000 .529** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.301 0.002  0.000 
      
Jordan Pearson Correlation 0.122 -0.146 .529** 1.000 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.353 0.265 0.000  
      
**  Correlations significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed) 
N=60 
Data Source:  http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca 
 
Again, Egypt has a significantly negative correlation between the Egyptian pound and the Saudi 
Dinar and a positive one with Jordanian Dinar.  Jordan has a negative but non-significant 
correlation with the Saudi Dinar.  Based on these data,  we can say the risks  each country‟s 
commercial banking system takes  with respect to domestic loans are very different from each 
other and are affected by the macro policies of their environment.   
 
Among the four countries,  Egypt has the largest depreciation of its currency in the time period 
under study.  One can find „hedging‟ strategies and instruments in ME by examining how the 
portfolio returns would change by investing in „neighbors‟.  The following table gives  three 
hypothetical cases of  Egyptian banks loaning out a portion of their funds to each of the other 
three countries.  The surface plot for the return/risk ratio using monthly data correlations  is 
given below.  The correlation coefficient used come from monthly data reported in Table 3.  
Table 4 is calculated on the assumption of 10 rate of return for Egyptian loans, with a standard 
deviation of 0.20.  These estimates are realistic, based on  the Central Bank of Egypt‟s quotes on  
the banking industry in Egypt, where the lending rate is, on average,  about 13 %  (CBE, 2004). 
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TABLE 4:  RETURN/RISK RATIOS FOR HYPOTHETICAL EGYPTIAN BANK PORTFOLIOS  USING 
MONTHLY DATA CORRELATIONS; U(1)=0.10, SD(1)=0.2  AND U(2)= 0.05, SD(2)=0.05 
 BAHRAIN SAUDI ARABIA JORDAN  
12 0 -0.397 0.529  
WEIGHT OF 
ASSET 1=  0 
 
1 1 1  
0.2 1.0607 1.3659 0.8578 BEST RATIO 
0.5 0.7276 0.8069 0.6511  
0.8 0.5614 0.5758 0.5438 Actual  lending in 
2000 
1 0.5 0.5 0.5  
 
 
The visual portfolio surface for Egyptian banks is given in Figure 4:  The frontal horizontal axis 
plots the  12.  The  highest return/risk ratios for the time period are with Saudi Arabian assets. 
 
FIGURE 4 
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Best return/risk   ratios  above are for portfolios with weight of  20 % of domestic currency  
(Asset 1)  for Egypt and therefore with weight of 80 % of foreign loans (Asset 2).  The actual 
ratios in Egyptian commercial banking system  are opposite.  Actual domestic  lending in Egypt 
is  70  % (down from 80% earlier) (see Table 1A in Appendix).  Egyptian banking system‟s 
performance can improve its return/risk  by moving more to  its optimal portfolio weights. 
 
How robust are the estimates of return/risk ratios  to  rates of returns and expected returns? The 
rates on the assets in Table 4 were nominal, there were no corrections made for  depreciation of 
the currency.  The devaluations as well as differential default rates among assets would also 
change the actual return/risk ratios and alter allocations.    Table 5 gives the  return/risk ratios for 
the case for the foreign asset when the returns are increased by 10 %  due to depreciation of local 
currency. 
 
 
TABLE 5:  RETURN/RISK RATIOS FOR HYPOTHETICAL EGYPTIAN BANK PORTFOLIOS  USING 
MONTHLY DATA CORRELATIONS; U(1)=0.10, SD(1)=0.2  AND U(2)= 0.15, SD(2)=0.15 
 BAHRAIN SAUDI ARABIA JORDAN  
12 0 -0.397 0.529  
WEIGHT OF 
ASSET 1=  0 
 
1 1 1  
0.2 1.07 1.268 0.964 BEST RATIO 
0.5 1 1.271 0.814  
0.8 0.676 0.73 0.619 Actual  lending 
1 0.5 0.5 0.5  
 
 
 
 
In this case again, the optimal weights of assets do not change.  Under what conditions would a 
portfolio of 80% in domestic assets would be preferable?  Some alternative scenarios on return 
and risk give us clues.  The results are summarized in Table 6. 
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TABLE  6:  SUMMARY OF  HIGHEST RETURN/RISK RATIO  AND WEIGHT OF ASSET 1 
 
 U(1) Sd(1) U(2) Sd(2) Optimal 
weight of 
Asset 1 
All  3 countries 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 80% 
 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 50% to 80 % 
 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 20%for  
Bahrain and 
Jordan,  
50 % for S.A. 
 
 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 50% 
 
 
We see that if the return to risk ratio in Egypt is  higher that the corresponding foreign assets, 
than a 80% domestic loan allocation is justifiable.  However, we do not observe such  return/risk 
ratios during this time period to justify this portfolio allocation.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Egyptian banking system is subject to poorer macro environment than those of its neighbors.  
Egypt  has the poorest macro environment and an application of portfolio analysis using currency 
risk showed that the commercial banking system should pay more attention to loaning funds 
outside of Egypt than it currently does. Whether this is done with credit card expansions into 
other countries, or whether  these are  investments into foreign public bonds will depend on very 
specific circumstances.  Egyptian banks had  a vested interest  in  expanding to  countries like 
Saudi Arabia because Saudi Dinar, for the time period under study, made a good hedge for the 
Egyptian pound and it still continues to do so.  While large domestic currency lending has 
insulated Egyptian banking system from the financial crisis of  2008 as of now, one can not say 
that Egyptian economy will remain unaffected.  Ripple effects  of this crisis will enter  the 
economy and the banking system through changes in exports, especially of industrial products.  
Therefore, hedging by diversification is still an important issue for the Egyptian banking system. 
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 TABLE 1A        
Egyptian  Banks : Lending and Discount Balances by Economic Activity 
                   (LE.mn) 
End of June 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
          
Total 204132 226776 241470 266100 284721 296199 308195 324041 353746 
          
In Local Currency 156287 180673 193981 213008 218695 228159 233141 238926 248544 
% local currency 76.56 79.67 80.33 80.05 76.81 77.03 75.65 73.73 70.26 
Agriculture 5515 4828.00 4749.00 5166.00 4521.00 5015.00 5822.00 4902.00 6985.85 
% agriculture 2.70 2.13 1.97 1.94 1.59 1.69 1.89 1.51 1.97 
Industry 47698 58410.00 64950.00 73178.00 74269.00 77722.00 81844.00 77734.00 80497.13 
% industry  23.37 25.76 26.90 27.50 26.08 26.24 26.56 23.99 22.76 
Trade 37997 42919.00 42797.00 47251.00 47530.00 48479.00 45648.00 43564.00 37476.00 
% trade 18.61 18.93 17.72 17.76 16.69 16.37 14.81 13.44 10.59 
Services 38278 45706.00 50260.00 54325.00 58546.00 60505.00 59870.00 61679.00 67034.69 
          
Other 26799 28810.00 31225.00 33088.00 33829.00 36438.00 39957.00 51047.00 56549.98 
          
In Foreign Currencies 47845 46103.00 47489.00 53092.00 66026.00 68040.00 75054.00 85115.00 105201.73 
% foreign currency 23.44 20.33 19.67 19.95 23.19 22.97 24.35 26.27 29.74 
Agriculture 499 526.00 554.00 550.00 447.00 550.00 619.00 829.00 928.84 
% agriculture 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.26 
Industry 19277 18817.00 19772.00 20561.00 26782.00 28569.00 34957.00 38517.00 51398.83 
% industry 9.44 8.30 8.19 7.73 9.41 9.65 11.34 11.89 14.53 
Trade 10197 8790.00 7983.00 9175.00 11557.00 12552.00 11893.00 13930.00 11837.00 
% trade 5.00 3.88 3.31 3.45 4.06 4.24 3.86 4.30 3.35 
Services 14855 14800.00 16124.00 20097.00 24341.00 23941.00 24188.00 26983.00 33842.37 
% services 7.28 6.53 6.68 7.55 8.55 8.08 7.85 8.33 9.57 
          
Unclassified sectors 3017 3170.00 3056.00 2709.00 2899.00 2428.00 3397.00 4856.00 7194.69 
   .       
source: Central Bank of Egypt (CBE)        
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TABLE  1B           
Egyptian Banks : Aggregate Balance Sheet                                                                     
                      
                     (LE.mn)  
End of June   1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Assets           
Cash  3220 3431 3485 4453 5557 5412 6594 6813 7705 
Securities&investments in TBs  of which : 60114 60818 71142 87726 111337 137431 170659 193965 176098 
      Treasury bills 21342 20601 28442 39740 53651 58633 91496 71181 60539 
      Other gov securities 19187 19888 20899 24423 33666 35104 43456 59614 50429 
             CBE notes    _ _ _ _ 21563 17617 
Balances with banks in Egypt 45098 49400 67047 83244 110874 116290 124986 121695 217363 
Balances with banks abroad 16106 17776 16252 20002 29798 43290 51204 72554 124366 
Loans and discounts 204132 226776 241470 266100 284722 296199 308195 324041 353746 
Other assets 22956 24137 28966 33939 35650 34814 41990 42494 58645 
           
Assets =Liabilities 351626 382338 428362 495464 577938 633436 703628 761562 937923 
Liabilities           
Capital  11373 11764 12038 12531 18155 20346 22949 27112 33037 
Reserves  8132 9226 10156 11238 11805 11454 12419 13418 12552 
Provisions  25984 27554 31200 35869 40099 44584 49541 54950 53469 
Long term loans&Bonds 9147 10579 11922 14057 14866 15012 14254 17526 26351 
Obligations to banks in Egypt 21413 24210 28158 35094 35578 29933 22671 21488 82619 
Obligations to banks abroad 11306 9970 11486 11830 16246 10332 12262 8770 10006 
Total deposits 237343 260429 291225 340868 403144 461697 519649 568841 649953 
Other liabilities 26928 28606 32177 33977 38043 40078 49883 49457 69936 
           
Source: CBE          
 
 
